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Introduction
ON MAY 9, 2012, Robin Hansen stood at the altar.1 The groom,
Bank of America, was nowhere to be found, presumably not from cold
feet but rather suffering from certain ineluctable corporeal difficul-
ties.2 Somehow, on July 26, 2012, Angela Marie Vogel’s spouse, the
ambiguously named “Corporate Person,” suffered from no such physi-
cal limitations.3 The betrothed were married, even in spite of Corpo-
rate Person’s obvious existential precariousness.4 Their marriage was
short-lived, however, as King County (Seattle, Washington) reversed
course and invalidated their marriage certificate.5 This was much to
the dismay of the supporters of “Initiative 103,” who, in 2012, at-
tempted to eliminate corporate constitutional rights and corporate
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3. Jake Ellison, Evan Hoover & Mallory Kaniss, Why King County Nixed Woman’s Mar-
riage to a Corporation in Seattle, KPLU (July 18, 2012, 1:06 PM), http://kplu.org/post/why-
king-county-nixed-woman-s-marriage-corporation-seattle. In her ceremony, Ms. Vogel used
a statue as a stand in for the “corporate person” she was marrying. Id.
4. Id.
5. Cameron Satterfield, a spokesperson for King County, stated that
[W]hen either party to a marriage is incapable of consent then its void, no longer
valid, or not valid period. So that’s the basis in which we went ahead and voided
the application. We went ahead and did that ourselves within our office because
by the time it would’ve gone to the state, they would’ve voided it anyways. So we
just avoided that altogether and voided it here.
Id.
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personhood in the city of Seattle.6 Babylonia Aivaz, another Seattle
native, followed in Robin and Angela Marie’s footsteps in her at-
tempted betrothal to a 107-year-old warehouse.7 Not to be outdone,
she publicly declared, “Yes, I’m in love with a 107 year old building!
Yes, IT’S A GAY MARRIAGE!”8 The warehouse was not available for
comment.
In attempting to exploit the ever-expanding definition of corpo-
rate personhood, these three quixotic women from the Pacific North-
west offer an interesting jurisprudential dilemma. In recent years, the
U.S. Supreme Court has provided the necessary legal foundation to
legitimize their attempts. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Su-
preme Court held that corporations were “persons” entitled to the
free exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).9 In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme
Court held that, at least for purposes of the First Amendment, corpo-
rations are treated as “persons” entitled to political speech.10 Concom-
itantly, the nation’s views on same-sex marriage have evolved along
with the expansion of corporate personhood under law. These views
have, in effect, transformed many marriage statutes from defining
marriage as between a “man and a woman” to between a “person and
a person”11 or some semantic equivalent. The central question
presented in this paper is: If a corporation is a person, and a person
can now marry another person regardless of gender, can a corporate
person marry a natural person?
6. Seattle Initiative 103: Limiting Corporate Rights and Elevating Peoples’ Rights, NETCEN-
TRIC ADVOCACY (May 14, 2012, 9:16 PM), http://www.network-centricadvocacy.net/2012/
05/seattle-initiative-103-limiting-corporate-rights-and-elevating-peoples-rights.html.
7. Woman Set to Marry Building Undeterred by Demolition Work, KOMONEWS.COM (Jan.
26, 2012, 3:48 PM), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/138158504.html.
8. Id.
9. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
10. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (rejecting the
argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated dif-
ferently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not “natural”
persons).
11. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-28b (West 2009) (“A marriage between two per-
sons entered into in this state and recognized as valid in this state may be recognized as a
marriage . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 650-A (2012) (“Marriage is the legally recog-
nized union of 2 people.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2010) (“Marriage is the legally
recognized union of 2 people.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-7 (West 2014) (“Marriage is
the legally recognized union of two (2) people.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West 2014)
(“Marriage is the legally recognized union of two people.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.04.010 (West 2014) (“Marriage is a civil contract between two persons who have each
attained the age of eighteen years, and who are otherwise capable.”).
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In this parable we assume that Harry, a young, idealistic, and
most importantly, natural person, seeks to wed Sallie Mae, the attrac-
tive corporate entity.12 The question of whether a corporation can
marry a person spawns several difficult legal questions, such as: How
does the corporation consent? Can it? If so, is this an action appropri-
ate for officers or the board, or does it require a shareholder vote?
This Article attempts to shed light on the Supreme Court’s sur-
prisingly lengthy history in establishing corporate personhood under
the Constitution. The fatuous, but not totally preposterous hypotheti-
cal offers an important examination of a disturbing trend.13 In Hobby
Lobby and Citizens United the Supreme Court has insisted on affording
constitutional protections traditionally reserved for human citizens to
corporate entities. This trend is troubling to say the least. The analysis
will begin with legal theory engineered at our nation’s founding and
continuing through to the turn of the twentieth century. Three com-
peting views of corporate personhood will be discussed. Next, the Arti-
cle will discuss the various provisions or legal doctrines under which
the Supreme Court has found corporate rights to exist or, in some
cases, not exist.
Additionally, the Article will discuss the sorts of marriage statutes
that might permit Harry and Sallie Mae to wed. Only those states that
have amended their respective marriage statutes to exclude references
to gender will be considered. The fundamental right to marry—if
such a right even exists—will also be discussed, as will the doctrines of
due process and equal protection, specifically for their ability to pro-
vide support for the requisite legal footing.
As the premise of the Article is to examine the admittedly fanciful
idea that a corporation could successfully marry a human being, basic
corporate law and the corporate decision-making structure will also be
12. Sallie Mae, or SLM Corporation, is a publicly-traded U.S. corporation whose oper-
ations are originating, servicing, and collecting on student loans. The use of the identical
name is merely an allusion to the movie referenced in the title, and is not intended to
indicate an association with or sponsorship by SLM, nor is it intended to disparage their
fine assortment of federally-guaranteed student loans.
13. For example, Jonathan Frieman of San Rafael, California, attempted to flaunt a
“carpool lane” regulation—“[c]arpool is two or more persons per vehicle”—by carrying
the corporate charter to his charity foundation in the front seat. The Marin County Supe-
rior Court judge was not swayed. Gregory Andersen, Driver Fights Carpool Lane Ticket, Claims
Corporation was Passenger, MARINSCOPE COMMUNITY NEWSPAPERS (Jan. 9, 2013, 11:35 AM),
http://www.marinscope.com/news_pointer/news/article_a9168c46-5a93-11e2-abaf-0019b
b2963f4.html; Justin Berton, Corporation Not Person in Carpool Lanes, SFGATE (Jan. 8, 2013,
10:38 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Corporation-not-person-in-carpool-
lanes-4173366.php.
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introduced. Specific attention will be paid to what types of scenarios
require corporate consent, who may consent on behalf of the corpora-
tion, and which scenarios are so fundamentally vital so as to necessi-
tate a shareholder vote. A portion of the analysis will determine
exactly what sort of corporate transaction a marriage would be and
what sorts of consequences on corporate form and shareholder power
it would have.
Eventually this Article will argue that, although an entertaining
exercise in legal hyperbole, the lack of corporate constitutional foot-
ing, so to speak, as well as incongruities under the corporate merger
doctrine and state registry, will continue to preclude similarly ambi-
tious women (or men) from the Pacific Northwest from marrying the
incorporated entity of their dreams.
I. The Corporate Person
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 2007 there were ap-
proximately thirty million businesses in the United States.14 In 1800,
only 335 business corporations were chartered, most of which were
organized in just the last few years of the eighteenth century.15 The
small number of charters was partially due to our nascence as a coun-
try, and partially because of the prevailing corporate distrust at the
time the nation was founded.16 Indeed, under the influence of Euro-
pean political philosophy, U.S. citizens saw corporations as “a way for
privileged elites to profit at the expense of the general public.”17
As such, in the minds of our forefathers, who were charged with
constructing a legal system, the very first corporations engendered na-
tional skepticism.18 The word “corporations” cannot be found within
the text of the Constitution, whereas the words “nations,”19 “states,”20
and “tribes”21 all can be. Nevertheless, as the United States expanded,
corporate growth was inevitable. Accordingly, new legal doctrines
14. Statistics about Business Size (including Small Business) from the U.S. Census Bureau,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2014).
15. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 426 n.53 (2010).
16. Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence
to Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523,
525–26 (2010).
17. Id. at 525 (citing TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER
AND THE DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY 39 (2003)).
18. See id. at 530–32.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 8, 9; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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emerged to account for the multitude of burgeoning corporate enti-
ties. Over time, three such major legal theories arose, all of which deal
with the inevitably difficult legal questions that inhere the rights and
responsibilities associated with starting an artificial entity.
A. The Corporation as an Artificial Person
Harry’s quest to marry a corporation raises many questions.
Would he be marrying that single corporate entity, or would he marry
all of its shareholders as well? Has the Supreme Court always treated
corporate personality as it did in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby? Is a
corporation a singular, living breathing entity, on par with those
humans who control it, or is it a collection of those associated breath-
ing individuals, acting as one? What if corporations are just com-
pletely artificial constructs of the State?
This Article begins with the last idea, that a corporation is an
imagined being, subject to the regulatory whim of the State. This was
the prevailing view of the early colonial and newly liberated United
States.22 The original corporate charters were drafted under the direc-
tives of their respective states, which oversaw corporate expansion
with a paternalistic eye.23 Corporations were artificial beings and, es-
sentially, the property of the state in which they were chartered.24 In-
deed, this is the precept from which the ultra vires doctrine sprang.25
The corporation was treated solely as a legal construct to facilitate
commerce—its personhood was incidental, such that a corporation
could have the right to hold property, enter into contracts, and sue
and be sued.26 The corporation was controlled and made by the peo-
ple. This policy was reflective of the era, when the fog of the nation’s
corporate distrust was still dissipating.27
22. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1147 (2012).
23. Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 108 (2009).
24. Id.
25. The ultra vires doctrine states that a corporation cannot engage in any activity not
specified in its state conferred charter. The doctrine is the bulwark of the notion that the
corporation is a creature of the state—that it is an artificial entity that owes its existence to
the state and an acknowledgement that whatever powers it possesses have been conferred
upon it by the state. See Rubin, supra note 16, at 539 n.97 (citing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 71, 186
(1992)).
26. Id.
27. See Rubin, supra note 16, at 534–35.
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In 1811, New York passed the first general law of incorporation.28
Thereafter, corporate law was fraught with hyper-regulation: States re-
stricted operational activities, demarcated corporate life spans, and
precluded corporations from owning stocks in other corporations.29
Indeed, “[s]tate attorneys general could actually revoke the charter of
corporations thereby forcing such corporations to dissolve.”30 Early in
the nineteenth century corporate law was devised to regulate in the
public, rather than private, interest.31 Corporations could be formed
to advance private interests but, unlike natural persons, they possessed
only those traits conferred by law, whether they served public or pri-
vate interests.32
The State corporate marionette act was accurately depicted in the
Supreme Court decision, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.33
There, the Court espoused, “A corporation is an artificial being, invisi-
ble, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the
charter of its creation confers upon it.”34 The Court was quick to high-
light the legally constructed and “unnatural” character of a corpora-
tion, further affirming the prevailing American sentiment at the
time.35 The Court did not go so far as to assert that corporations do
not have constitutional rights, however—the Court held that the cor-
poration was entitled to protection under the Contracts Clause.36
However, as the United States, its people, and its commerce ex-
panded through the nineteenth century, so did the desire for deregu-
lation.37 For example, the New Jersey legislature decided to abolish
the maximum limits on capitalism38 and, for the first time, allowed
corporations to purchase stock in other corporations.39 Deregulation
28. NACE, supra note 17, at 72.
29. Rubin, supra note 16, at 537.
30. Id. at 532 (internal quotation omitted).
31. Ripken, supra note 23, at 108–09.
32. Johnson, supra note 22, at 1144–45.
33. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
34. Id. at 636.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 706; U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
37. See Rubin, supra note 16, at 538. New Jersey’s decision to loosen the restrictions on
corporate regulation ushered in a domino effect across the mid-Atlantic states. Id.
38. Id. at 537–38 (“Charters sometimes even limited the profit corporations could
make, requiring them to buy back stock with excess profits ‘so that eventually all stockhold-
ers would be eliminated and the company would in effect become a public entity under
the supervision of the state legislature.’”) (quoting NACE, supra note 17, at 51).
39. See Rubin, supra note 16, at 538.
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ran rampant; states, not wishing to lose business to New Jersey, quickly
followed suit.40 The idea that “the corporation actually owed its exis-
tence to the individuals who formed the corporation to conduct their
business,” eventually replaced the view of the corporation as an artifi-
cial entity belonging to the State, thereby marking the beginnings of
the aggregate theory of corporate personhood.41
B. The Corporation as an Aggregate Person
Unlike the artificial entity theory, the aggregate theory supported
a hands-off, anti-regulatory approach to corporate law.42 By the later
half of the nineteenth century the anti-monopolisitic sentiments
evoked during the Revolutionary Era were long gone.43 Naturally, this
coincided with the “spectacular rise of the business corporation” dur-
ing that same period.44 The corporation was no longer seen as a dis-
tinctly state-owned entity, but rather “more [of] a collection, or
aggregate, of individuals who contracted with each other to utilize the
corporation for their mutual benefit.”45 Accordingly, “ ‘the rights and
duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights and du-
ties of the persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being.’”46
In the last half of the nineteenth century, the predominant view
of the corporate existential dilemma focused less on that of the entity
and its filial duty to its “creator,” the State, and more on individual
will.47 As a result, corporate law evolved such that that the “corporate
person” had no existence or identity separate and apart from the nat-
ural persons in the corporation.48 Indeed, it also served to boldly as-
sert “the primacy of the individual over the group as the key analytical
focus in corporate theory and activity.”49
Eventually, the rest of the legal system recognized this as well. In
Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, the Supreme Court
40. Id.
41. Ripken, supra note 23, at 109.
42. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1989).
43. See Rubin, supra note 16, at 531.
44. Id. at 539.
45. Ripken, supra note 23, at 110.
46. Id. (quoting 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS 3 (2d ed. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1886)).
47. Id. at 109–10.
48. Id. at 110 (“In fact, no corporate acts would ever occur without the human per-
sons who made up the corporate entity.”).
49. Johnson, supra note 22, at 1159.
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recognized corporations as citizens in order to establish jurisdiction.50
In the same year, the Court went on to dismiss a writ of error brought
by “anything but a human being, or an aggregation of human beings,
called a corporation or association.”51 The adoption of the aggregate
theory continued in the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, in which the Court held that, at least
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a corporation was a per-
son.52 There, the Court held that a corporation’s property could not
be taxed differently from that of an independent, natural individual.53
In the Railroad Tax Cases, Fourteenth Amendment rights were articu-
lated to belong to the “aggregations of individuals united for some
legitimate business.”54 Indeed, the court averred, “[T]he courts will
always look beyond the name of the artificial being to the individuals
whom it represents.”55
This type of corporate theory found repose in an environment
where closely-held corporations, entities owned by just a few share-
holders, abounded. Those few individuals who controlled all the cor-
porate shares would act collectively as if the corporation really was an
aggregate of their collective selves. However, the onset of the twenti-
eth century saw marked corporate growth, in both the number and
size of corporations.56 Accordingly, the number of shareholders grew,
ownership rights were dispersed amongst them, and the quantity of
individual holdings decreased.57 As a result, a rapidly growing discon-
nect emerged between the ontological identities of the corporation
and its shareholders, both in economic and practical terms.58 Conse-
quently, the real entity theory of corporations emerged.
50. Marshall v. Balt. & O. R.R. Co., 57 U.S. 314, 328 (1853). Justice Campbell, how-
ever, was disturbed by the majority’s decision, wondering “when the mischief would end.”
Id. at 353 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
51. Steamboat Burns, 76 U.S. 237, 238 (1869).
52. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (“The court does
not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of
opinion that it does.”).
53. Id.
54. Cnty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R. Co., 13 F. 722, 743 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
55. Id. at 744.
56. Donald J. Smythe, The Rise of the Corporation, the Birth of Public Relations, and the
Foundations of Modern Political Economy, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 635, 636–37 (2011).
57. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–25 (1932) (explaining that as corporations grew the models of
ownership changed dramatically).
58. For instance, in a company with widely-held stock, it would be unfair to hold
shareholders with fractional interest individually liable for the corporation’s debts or
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C. The Corporation as a Real and Independent Person: The
Twentieth Century
The turn of the twentieth century saw a continued corporate
boom; the increase of widely held corporations—both in number of
shareholders per corporation and numbers of corporations them-
selves—portended a doctrinal transformation.59 Corporations “were
understood as conceptually and legally distinct from investors, manag-
ers, and other participants.”60 Accordingly, the “regulation of business
became the paramount domestic issue in American politics.”61
Since corporations were no longer emblems of those few inves-
tors who created them, the idea developed that the corporation was
itself an entity; soon thereafter, the real entity theory became the nor-
mative legal milieu. The real entity theory diverged from doctrines of
corporate personhood discussed in the two previous sections. The real
entity theory does not suggest that the corporation is a manufactured
state construct, as the artificial entity theory does; nor does it view a
corporation as the sum of its individual parts, as in the aggregate the-
ory.62 Rather, the corporation is viewed as a “full-fledged, living reality
that exists as an objective fact and has a real personality in society.”63
Indeed, the corporate entity is “entitled to the same rights as per-
sons.”64 The corporation is said to have “a ‘collective consciousness’ or
‘collective will’ that results from discussion and compromise among
the individual members, and may not reflect the particular prefer-
ences of anyone person.”65
Long gone were the days of the colonial-era paternalistic State—
substituted was a lasting era of free incorporation.66 Just as the “state
stocks. The development of the corporation as having its own personality was a necessary
anthropomorphism to assume accountability for such legal responsibilities. Darrell A.H.
Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 924 (2011).
59. See Rubin, supra note 16, at 539–40; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905)
(allowing corporations to receive the benefits of the deregulation that took place during
that period of the Court’s jurisprudence).
60. Johnson, supra note 22, at 1154.
61. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Government Versus Business: An American Phenomenon, in
THE ESSENTIAL ALFRED CHANDLER: ESSAYS TOWARD A HISTORICAL THEORY OF BIG BUSINESS
428 (Thomas K. McGraw ed., 1988).
62. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 297 (1990).
63. See Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Contro-
versy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 584 (1999).
64. Rubin, supra note 16, at 539.
65. Ripken, supra note 23, at 114.
66. See Rubin, supra note 16, at 537.
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may record the birth of every baby, or the sale of every land parcel,”
under the real entity doctrine, the State recorded the formation of
every corporation.67 Corporations were no longer defined by the ag-
gregate behavior of their constituents, but rather were judged by
courts to be responsible for the consequences of their own actions.68
With this recognition came both responsibilities and entitle-
ments. Corporations, as individualized entities, had to personally an-
swer for their debts and torts.69 Corporations, in a sense, could be
“personally” culpable for criminal activity.70 Corporations were said to
“act” for themselves.71 This is reflected semantically: “We say, for ex-
ample, that Nike denied that it knew about the wrongdoing, Exxon
believes it treats its employees fairly, AOL signed a merger agreement
with Time-Warner, and the Disney Channel loves young audiences.”72
Under federal precedent, corporations saw their legal rights and
responsibilities increase as well.73 Of course, no one could predict just
how far the law would go in treating corporations as “people”:
In treating an incorporated group of persons as a separate person,
the law is taking the rules about ordinary persons and extending by
analogy to apply to groups of persons who have complied with cer-
tain legal formalities . . . . How far they can be held criminally and
civilly liable and how far they are capable of enjoying certain rights
and privileges will depend on how far the analogy is taken; and this
in turn should depend on how far we think it desirable in the pub-
lic interest of them to have such rights and liabilities. And while
there is no logical compulsion to make the analogy complete,
there is no particular point at which by any rule of logic the anal-
ogy must cease to hold.74
67. Ripken, supra note 23, at 112–13.
68. The corporation, as an individual, could reap profits. Conversely, as an individual,
the corporation could also have criminal intent, and be held culpable. Id. at 114–15.
69. See Miller, supra note 58, at 923.
70. See Ripken, supra note 23, at 115 (explaining that this era ushered in an ideologi-
cal shift).
71. Id.; see United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (“[A] corporation
may commit an offense . . . .”).
72. See Ripken, supra note 23, at 115; see also Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a
Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563, 595 (1987) (explaining the
linguistic basis for treating the corporation as a person by showing that it is part of ordinary
language to speak about institutions as though they are persons, and that this way of speak-
ing is independent of the law).
73. In the nineteenth century, corporations themselves were not always held responsi-
ble for their actions; the agents of the corporations, and not the corporations themselves
were held liable. See Rubin, supra note 16, at 540–41. As corporate law began to proliferate,
the jurisprudence changed: corporations could be held accountable for their torts, but
they could also benefit from constitutional protections as well. See infra Part II.
74. Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational ‘Real Entity’
Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 599 (1989) (internal quotation omitted).
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The law has not gone so far so as to expressly allow corporations
to marry. However, in examining whether it would be possible, an ex-
planation of the existing constitutional corporate landscape is
necessary.
II. Corporate Constitutional Rights
A. A Survey of Corporate Rights
What rights do corporations possess under the Constitution? If
they have to answer for their debts and torts, what protections do they
receive? If they have fundamental First Amendment protections just as
people do, what about marriage rights? What of other rights?
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has affirmed the breadth
of the corporate personhood doctrine. First, the Court, in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission—a five to four decision—held that
limits on a corporation’s right to engage in electioneering communi-
cations violated the First Amendment.75 In doing so, the Court over-
ruled its decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which
held that political speech may be regulated based on the speaker’s
corporate identity.76 The decision has been described as “a near-com-
plete vindication of the belief that the Constitution protects a corpora-
tion’s political speech just as much as it protects the political speech
of individuals.”77
Central to the majority’s decision in Citizens United was the ex-
plicit issue of whether a corporation, by virtue of being an artificial
75. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010).
76. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1989), overruled
by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. The history predating Austin is lengthy. In Buckley v. Valeo,
the Court addressed amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, whose
1974 amendments included an independent expenditure ban that applied to corporations
and labor unions, as well as individuals. 424 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1976). Following Buckley, the
Supreme Court decided First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
There, the Supreme Court faced the critical issue of whether corporations have the same
rights as natural persons for purposes of the First Amendment. Id. at 776–77. First National
Bank sought to spend money to influence a ballot initiative, however, a Massachusetts law
prohibited corporations from making expenditures that would affect elections. Id. at
767–70. The Court noted, “[i]f the speakers here were not corporations, no one would
suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech.” Id. at 777. In holding that
corporate First Amendment speech was protected, the majority referenced the Courts pre-
vious recognition that the major purpose of the Amendment was to protect the free discus-
sion of governmental affairs. Id. at 776–77 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966)). This stood until Austin, where, for the first time, the Court upheld “a direct re-
striction on the independent expenditure of funds.” Austin, 494 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
77. Miller, supra note 58, at 893.
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entity rather than an organic one, was a sufficient basis to impede the
speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.78 Relying on First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,79 the Court rejected “the argument
that political speech of corporations or other associations should be
treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such
associations are not ‘natural persons.’”80 In explaining why this is so,
Justice Scalia offered an insightful comment: “The [First] Amend-
ment is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers. Its text offers no
foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from single individu-
als to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations of
individuals, to incorporated associations of individuals . . . .”81 Justice
Scalia’s First Amendment analysis is an example of the Court’s ten-
dency to concentrate on the scope of the constitutional right, rather
than who invokes that right.82 Moreover, with respect to the issue of
corporate marriage, it is important to note that the majority described
a corporation as an “association of individuals,”83 suggesting that a
corporation is best understood as a collection of natural persons.
From this we may draw two inferences about Citizens United: (1) The
Court invoked the aggregate theory of corporate personhood; and (2)
an aggregation of citizens maintains full speech protection under the
First Amendment.
The Court reexamined corporate rights of freedom of expression
in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.84 Hobby Lobby is a freedom of relig-
ious expression case in which the Court weighed whether corpora-
tions were exempt from a statutory mandate which forced the
corporations to provide various types of health insurance coverage,
including certain forms of contraceptives.85 The Court held that a cor-
poration does not have to provide such health care coverage if the cor-
poration holds sincere religious objections to the contraceptive
mandate.86 The Court’s opinion is essentially divided into three parts.
First, the Court relied on the Dictionary Act, which the Court
“must consult ‘[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
78. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343.
79. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765.
80. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343.
81. Id. at 392.
82. E.g., Miller, supra note 58, at 927.
83. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 392.
84. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
85. See id. at 2759.
86. Id. at 2775.
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unless the context indicates otherwise.’”87 Under the Dictionary Act,
“the word[ ] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associa-
tions, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well
as individuals.”88 So, when reviewing any act of Congress, a court’s
assessment of to whom the act applies will always possess the potential
for a corporate personhood debate.
Second, the Court engaged in a discussion of the “very broad pro-
tection for religious liberty” at stake.89 The Court held that by “enact-
ing RFRA, Congress went far beyond what this Court has held is
constitutionally required.”90 Specifically, “Congress mandated that
this concept ‘be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious
exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chap-
ter and the Constitution.’”91 The breadth of the discussion surround-
ing the right to free religious exercise reinforces the Court’s “modern
tendency . . . to concentrate on the scope of the constitutional right,
rather than corporate personality.”92
Third, and perhaps the most telling portion of the opinion, the
Court’s reintroduced the aggregate theory. The Court asserted, “[I]t
is important to keep in mind that the purpose of [treating corpora-
tions as persons] is to provide protection for human beings.”93 The
Court continued:
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human be-
ings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies
the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders,
officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in
one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statu-
tory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the
rights of these people.94
It is important to note the narrowness of Hobby Lobby’s holding.
As discussed earlier,95 with corporate ownership dispersed across mul-
tiple shareholders, the aggregate theory starts to unravel; one corpo-
rate person cannot be hundreds of underlying people. The Court
acknowledged this by limiting its holding to closely held corporations.
The Court observed that “the idea that unrelated shareholders—in-
87. Id. at 2769 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
88. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
89. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.
90. Id. at 2767.
91. Id. at 2762 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(g) (2000)).
92. Miller, supra note 58, at 927.
93. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
94. Id. at 2766.
95. See Miller, supra note 58, at 931.
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cluding institutional investors with their own set of stakeholders—
would agree to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs
seems improbable.”96 Thus, the Court’s holding that furthering cor-
porate religious freedom furthers “individual religious freedom,” is
applicable to corporations with a small audience of shareholders.97
The duet of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby ensure that going for-
ward the Supreme Court will decide cases involving the rights of cor-
porations by focusing on the depth of the constitutional right
asserted, rather than looking to the rights of a corporation’s share-
holders. The Court’s invocation of the Dictionary Act ensures that dis-
cussions of corporate personhood will always lurk in the shadows of
any congressional debate. In rapid succession, the Court approved
corporate political speech98 and corporate religious expression,99 af-
firming that the First Amendment sphere applies to corporations. But
just how far do the First Amendment rights of corporations extend?
And rights under different amendments?
1. Corporate First Amendment Rights
While corporations can influence the electoral process, they them-
selves cannot vote.100 Promoters of corporate rights argue that be-
cause corporations are “people” under the Fourteenth Amendment,
corporations are entitled to the “same liberties of expression that indi-
viduals enjoy, including protection for their religious expression.”101
Because the Fourteenth Amendment ensures the right to be free from
unlawful deprivations of liberty by the State, and because free speech
is an enumerated liberty under the First Amendment, Julie Marie
Baworowsky proposed that corporate religious speech was and contin-
ues to be protected by the Constitution.102 Hobby Lobby affirmed her
prognostication.
96. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
97. Id. at 2794.
98. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010).
99. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (plurality opinion); Julie Marie
Baworowsky, From Public Square to Market Square: Theoretical Foundations of First and Fourteenth
Amendment Protection of Corporate Religious Speech, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1714 (2008).
100. See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (explaining that corporations may influ-
ence voters via traditional channel, but do not have the right to vote, which citizens possess
under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments).
101. Baworowsky, supra note 99, at 1748.
102. Id.
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2. Corporate Second Amendment Rights
Along these same lines, Darrell A.H. Miller suggested that corpo-
rations could potentially have Second Amendment rights as well.103
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the right of a “natural per-
son” to keep and bear arms in McDonald v. City of Chicago104 and in
District of Columbia v. Heller.105 In both cases, the Justices focused on
the personal right to self-defense and to band together for self-de-
fense.106 Miller reminds us of the anti-tyrannical aim of the Second
Amendment, concluding that “[a]ssociations, no less than natural per-
sons, have an interest in banding together for self-protection.”107 He
argues that “[j]ust as individuals can better exercise their First Amend-
ment rights by associating together, individuals can better exercise
their Second Amendment rights by association.”108 Although both
Washington and Arizona have specifically denied corporations the
right to bear arms,109 Miller nevertheless claims that corporations
could very well possess the right to bear arms under four circum-
stances:110 (1) private security or the right to personally defend the
company;111 (2) ideological associations, such as the Black
Panthers;112 (3) guns-to-work laws, or allowing company employees to
store firearms on their property;113 and (4) the commercial firearm
trade, whereby “a firearms manufacturer, distributor, or other corpo-
rate entity [would] claim a right to be free from government
restriction.”114
103. See Miller, supra note 58, at 889. At least one other social commentator has made
the same observations. See Steven Clifford, High Court Rules Corporations Have Right To Bear
Arms, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2010, 1:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-
clifford/high-court-rules-corporat_b_435619.html.
104. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the Sec-
ond Amendment right to keep and bear arms restricts state and local governments to the
exact same degree it restricts the federal government).
105. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600 (2008) (holding the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a personal right, and laws preventing a person
from keeping and transporting an operable handgun in the home are unconstitutional).
106. See id.; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026.
107. Miller, supra note 58, at 890. However, Miller goes on observing that “many states
have anti-militia laws that restrict the ability of private groups to train together with private
arms or to form private self-defense forces.” Id.
108. Id. at 938.
109. Id. at 905.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 906.
113. Id. at 907.
114. Id.
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3. Corporate Third Amendments Rights
Although there is no case law on the subject, the rarely in-
voked115 Third Amendment protections against quartering soldiers
during peacetime could apply to corporate property.116 This is espe-
cially so because the Constitution recognizes corporate property rights
against takings pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.117 The argument
for corporate protections under the Third Amendment follows be-
cause the Third Amendment and the Takings Clause are viewed as a
guarantee of private property rights,118 the two may be read to-
gether119 to afford corporations a synergistic right against compelled
quartering of soldiers.
4. The Remainder of the Bill of Rights
Fourth Amendment rights are afforded to corporations based on
more established legal footing. Although corporations do not enjoy a
right to privacy equivalent to individuals under the Fourth Amend-
ment,120 they are still protected against unreasonable searches.121 Cor-
porate books and records, however, carry no right to personal
privacy.122 Corporations likewise have the Fifth Amendment right
against double jeopardy,123 but do not have the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.124 The Sixth Amendment right to a
trial by jury has also been applied to corporations,125 as well as the
115. Only one court has ever defined the amendment: Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957,
962 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The absence of any case law directly construing [the amendment]
presents a serious interpretive problem . . . .”); see also William Sutton Fields, The Third
Amendment: Constitutional Protection from the Involuntary Quartering of Soldiers, 124 MIL. L. REV.
195, 210 (1989).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
117. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931); U.S. CONST.
amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
118. See Fields, supra note 115, at 210.
119. See Thomas G. Sprankling, Does Five Equal Three? Reading the Takings Clause in Light
of the Third Amendment’s Protection of Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 123 (2012).
120. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 650–52 (1950); Fleck & Assocs.
v. City of Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
121. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (“The Warrant Clause of
the Fourth Amendment protects commercial property as well as private homes.”).
122. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944).
123. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977).
124. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384 (1911) (“While an individual may law-
fully refuse to answer incriminating questions . . . it does not follow that a corporation,
vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged
with an abuse of such privileges.”).
125. United States v. Greenpeace, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
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right to counsel,126 just not the right to a public defender.127 It is un-
clear whether corporations possess Eighth Amendment rights against
cruel and unusual punishment,128 or against excessive fines.129
5. The Fourteenth Amendment
It is well-settled that corporations are “persons” for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment.130 Corporations possess the right to
equal protection under law131 and the right to procedural due pro-
cess.132 Interestingly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals even granted
third-party standing to corporations that allege race discrimination.133
Semantically, corporate rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
faced an uphill battle in that the provisions of the amendment apply
to “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States.”134 This
Article has explored many reasons for deeming corporations “per-
sons,” however, the fact that a corporation cannot be “born” or “natu-
ralized” would appear to strike a fatal blow to the proliferation of the
126. United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Phila., Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1979).
127. United States v. Unimex, Inc., 991 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Being incorpo-
real, corporations cannot be imprisoned, so they have no constitutional right to appointed
counsel.”).
128. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22
(1989) (“We shall not decide whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive
fines applies to the several States through the Fourteenth Amendment, nor shall we decide
whether the Eighth Amendment protects corporations as well as individuals.”).
129. See id. at 285 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189
(1888) (“Under the designation of a ‘person’ there is no doubt that a private corporation
is included.”).
131. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985); Santa Clara Cnty. v.
S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
132. Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896)
(“It is now settled that corporations are persons within the constitutional provisions forbid-
ding the deprivation of property without due process of law, as well as a denial of the equal
protection of the law.”).
133. Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 13–14 (1st Cir. 1979); see also
Robert N. Strassfeld, Corporate Standing to Allege Race Discrimination in Civil Rights Actions, 69
VA. L. REV. 1153, 1153–54 (1983). This is not to say that corporations can be victims of race
discrimination. Id. at 1159 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court, in a single sentence of dictum, re-
jected the notion that a corporation could be the direct target of race discrimination. It
did not decide whether a corporation had standing to assert the rights of third persons in a
race discrimination suit.”). Furthermore, third-party standing as a cure to corporate stand-
ing issues in race discrimination cases is problematic for two reasons: courts retain discre-
tion on the issue; and it is premised on third-party rights of corporate shareholders that
might not exist. Id. at 1156.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
140 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
idea of corporate personhood under law.135 Accordingly, in 1870, Jus-
tice Woods wrote that “[o]nly natural persons can be born or natural-
ized; only natural persons can be deprived of life or liberty; so that it is
clear that artificial persons are excluded,” from the Fourteenth
Amendment.136
Despite Justice Woods’ sentiments, the right to corporate equal
protection under law was formally entrenched in Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific Railroad, which held that a corporation’s property
could not be taxed differently from that of a natural individual.137
Santa Clara was the product of the liberal application of the Equal
Protection Clause at that time—indeed, in County of San Mateo v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Company the court observed that the clause
was “protective and remedial, not punitive in character, and should,
therefore, be liberally, not strictly, construed.”138 The court held,
“whenever a provision of the constitution, or of a law, guaranties to
persons the enjoyment of property, or affords to them means for its
protection, or prohibits legislation injuriously affecting it, the benefits
of the provision extend to corporations.”139
From Santa Clara onward, corporate protection under the Equal
Protection Clause continued.140 Interestingly, since the Santa Clara de-
cision in 1886, 307 Fourteenth Amendment cases have come before
the Supreme Court. Despite the recent emancipation of freed slaves—
and their ensuing battle for equal protection in the face of Jim
Crow—only nineteen decisions dealt with the rights of African-Ameri-
cans;141 the rest dealt with corporate constitutional rights.142
135. Note that corporations might be “persons,” under the Equal Protection or Due
Process Clauses, but they are not “citizens” for purposes of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Ulmer v. First Nat. Bank, 55 So. 405, 466–67 (Fla. 1911).
136. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (D. La. 1870) (No. 7,052).
137. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 398 (1886).
138. Cnty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R. Co., 13 F. 722, 759 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
139. Id. at 744.
140. See Smyth v. Ames, 171 U.S. 361, 365 (1898); Charlotte, Columbia, and Augusta
R.R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 389 (1892); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S.
205, 209 (1888).
141. Rubin, supra note 16, at 567; see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 403–04
(1857) (holding that people of African descent imported into the United States and held
as slaves, or their descendants, whether or not they were slaves, were not protected by the
Constitution and could never be citizens of the United States).
142. Rubin, supra note 16, at 567.
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B. Corporate Marriage Rights
With this constitutional background in mind, this Article reaches
the issue of how a court would rule on a corporate-human marriage in
a state where marriage is not defined as between a man and a woman,
but rather between a person and a person.143 This portion of the Arti-
cle will track the doctrinal analysis followed by the majority in Citizens
United. Thus, the issue is as such: If the “[g]overnment may not sup-
press political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,”144
may the government suppress marriage rights on the basis of the be-
trothed’s corporate identity?
Citizens United affirmed a corporation’s right to exercise the right
to free speech, in order to prevent “destroying the [fundamental] lib-
erty” enjoyed by people and corporations alike.145 On Citizens United’s
heels, Hobby Lobby emphasized the right to protect religious expres-
sion, even if the one asserting the right is an artificial entity.146 This
aligns with the Court’s modern tendency, as discussed above, to focus
on the scope of the constitutional right, rather than on the identity of
the person or entity invoking that right.147 So long as a constitutional
right is asserted, the Court will take pains to protect it, irrespective of
the corporeality of the “person” seeking constitutional protection.
1. The Fundamental Right to Marry
Does Sallie Mae have a right to marry Harry? The Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect persons
from a deprivation of life, liberty, or property by a government en-
tity148 without sufficient justification.149 Because marriage-filing re-
quirements are state-based,150 the focus shifts to the Due Process
143. Cf. supra note 11 (comparing the language of marriage statutes from several
states).
144. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (emphasis
added).
145. Id. at 354–55 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 130 (James Madison) (B. Wright
ed., 1961)).
146. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
147. See Miller, supra note 58, at 927.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
149. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 353 (1986).
150. See Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1375, 1378 n.7 (2010) (“In most states, to enter a civil marriage, a couple must
apply for a state marriage license, generally by completing a form that demonstrates that
they meet the marriage requirements as defined under state law, and they must solemnize
their marriage in a civil proceeding or religious ceremony after which the (religious or
secular) officiant files the marriage license with the state.”).
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Clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.151 A deprivation of
the right to life, liberty, or property without such justification violates
the doctrine of substantive due process.152 Courts have not only used
substantive due process to protect those rights enumerated in the
Constitution, but have held that there are certain unenumerated
rights that merit protection as well.153 Despite not appearing in the
text of the Constitution, these rights, such as the right to custody of
one’s children,154 or the right to contraception,155 fall under the “lib-
erties” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.156
In establishing the substantive due process doctrine, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that some rights are so fundamental to the
basic liberties that the Constitution aims to protect that they must be
held nearly inviolable, even without reliance on an explicit constitu-
tional provision.157 Thus, although some fundamental rights, includ-
ing free speech158 and the right to exercise one’s religion,159 are
explicit, the Court makes clear that it may articulate and expand other
implicit rights.
The right to marry has been deemed one such fundamental lib-
erty. In the seminal case Loving v. Virginia, which invalidated the iniq-
uitous Virginia anti-miscegenation law, the Supreme Court observed
that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.”160 In finding that the law violated the Due Process Clause,
the Court, presciently focusing on the constitutional right,161 found
marriage to be “‘one of the basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to
our very existence and survival.”162 The fundamental right to marriage
151. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”) (emphasis added).
152. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (recognizing a fun-
damental right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections against the depriva-
tion of a person’s life, liberty or property).
153. See, e.g., Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853–55 (1998); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722–23 (1997).
154. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972).
155. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
156. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
157. See id. at 847–49.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
159. Id.
160. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
161. See Miller, supra note 58, at 927 (explaining the Court’s modern tendency is to
concentrate on the scope of the constitutional right, rather than on that entity seeking to
enforce that right).
162. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
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was later affirmed in Turner v. Safely, a case applying the right to marry
to prisoners, despite the fact that they possess reduced constitutional
liberty interests.163
More recently, the landmark case United States v. Windsor invali-
dated the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), finding unconstitutional
DOMA’s restrictions on same-sex marriage benefits.164 The Court rec-
ognized DOMA’s framework as a deprivation of due process, holding
that it injured the very class it was designed to protect.165 The decision
frequently, although obliquely, referred to the “right to marry” and
the rights that a government entity must imbue—without regard to
the gender composition of the marriage.166 In doing so, it recognized
that, although “Congress has great authority to design laws to fit its
own conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.”167 It is exactly this liberty inter-
est that must be further examined.
2. The Corporate Right to Substantive Due Process?
At this point Harry and Sallie Mae face an unusual inquiry: not as
to which rights are protected under the substantive due process um-
brella, but rather which persons may invoke the doctrine. The Supreme
Court addressed the issue in BMW of North America v. Gore, a case in
which a jury awarded $4 million in punitive damages against a BMW
distributor for failing to disclose to dealers and customers that it had
repainted the “new” cars because of acid rain damage.168 In affirming
the remittur of $2 million, the Court identified a substantive due pro-
cess right against a grossly excessive damages award.169 Importantly,
the Court imbued the right to BMW of North America, a corporation.
Nevertheless, the scope must be drawn more narrowly than
merely substantive due process. The text of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment references life and property, as well as the liberty interest about
which this Article is concerned. Just three years before the BMW deci-
sion, the Supreme Court in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., held that a “grossly excessive” punitive award amounted to an
163. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 94 (1987).
164. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2675 (2013).
165. Id. at 2693 (examining a federal issue, as opposed to a state issue, the Court chose
the Fifth Amendment as the aperture through which to find the constitutional infirmity).
166. See generally id. (discussing the purpose and practical effect of DOMA).
167. Id. at 2695 (emphasis added).
168. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 564 (1996).
169. Id. at 574–75.
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“arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of law.”170 Like-
wise, the Fifth Circuit in Conroe Creosoting Co. v. Montgomery Cnty., Tex.,
held that where a state official deprives a corporation of its property in
a manner that “shocks the conscience,” substantive due process may
be violated.171 Together those decisions establish that corporations do
have substantive due process rights, but only insofar as the right to
property is concerned.
However, the relevant inquiry is whether corporations have liberty
rights under substantive due process. In a decision from 1906, the Su-
preme Court stated the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is the “liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.”172 More
recently, the Seventh Circuit similarly held that corporations may not
claim substantive due process protection because corporations have
no “fundamental” rights.173 Indeed, Judge Frank Easterbrook perhaps
put it best: “Corporations do not have fundamental rights; they do not
have liberty interests, period.”174
This accords with the purely human nature of the unenumerated
fundamental rights. The Supreme Court waxed poetic about these
rights, describing them as necessary:
[T]o engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren, to worship God according to the dictates of his own con-
science, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . .
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.175
None of these seem to naturally belong to the corporation. Thus,
along with the right to contraception,176 the right to raise one’s
child,177 and many other quintessentially personal liberties, the “corpo-
rate fundamental right” appears to be an oxymoronic solecism. Even
though the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby opinions devote a great
deal attention to the scope of the constitutional right being as-
serted,178 it appears that there is no eluding a corporation’s status as
170. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–54 (1993).
171. Conroe Creosoting Co. v. Montgomery Cnty., 249 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2001).
172. Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906).
173. Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Comm’rs, 57 F.3d 505, 514 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Mid-
American Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Gary, 49 F.3d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1995)).
174. Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir.
1995).
175. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (internal quotations and cita-
tions omitted).
176. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
177. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972).
178. See Miller, supra note 58, at 927.
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an entity, rather than a human in society. Unfortunately for Harry and
Sallie Mae the fundamental right to marry will not help them in their
quest to wed.
3. Corporate Equal Protection: The Hail Mary
Harry and Sallie Mae still possess one remaining constitutional
argument: that denying a person the right to marry a corporation,
solely on the basis of its status as a non-human entity, denies the cor-
poration the equal protection of laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike.”179 Legislation is generally valid “if the classifi-
cation drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest . . . [and w]hen social or economic legislation is at issue, the
Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude.”180
The primary issue is doctrinal: With much of the case law analyz-
ing marriage rights under due process,181 courts would undoubtedly
hesitate to apply the equal protection framework in Harry and Sallie
Mae’s case. Nevertheless, a glimmer of hope remains. Despite the
Court’s insistence that the fundamental right to marry is a due process
issue, according to Patricia Cain, the opacity of legal doctrine applied
in certain cases leads her to the conclusion that “[o]ne cannot even
tell under current Supreme Court jurisprudence whether marriage is
a ‘fundamental right’ for purposes of substantive due process . . . or
whether it is only a fundamental right whose allocation must adhere
to notions of equal protection.”182 Safe to say, this doctrinal approach
is precarious, at best.
The doctrinal bases for many decisions dealing with the right to
marry are difficult to discern—some decisions are decided on equal
protection grounds, while others invoke due process. In Loving, for
example, although the Court found a due process violation, the rea-
soning employed by the Court was emblematic of an equal protection
analysis.183 The Court reasoned: “To deny this fundamental freedom
179. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
180. Id. at 440 (internal citations omitted).
181. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 419–22 (Cal. 2008); Goodridge v.
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 960–61 (Mass. 2003); see also Jennifer L. Heeb,
Homosexual Marriage, the Changing American Family, and the Heterosexual Right to Privacy, 24
SETON HALL L. REV. 347, 380–84 (1993) (arguing that due process is the best avenue for
litigants to invoke marriage rights).
182. Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QLR 27, 32–33 (1996).
183. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in
these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment.”184 This italicized lan-
guage is a clear indicator that the Court viewed the anti-miscegena-
tion statute as discriminating on the basis of a racial classification, a
quintessential equal protection violation. The line became even more
blurred in the 1978 decision, Zablocki v. Redhail.185 In Zablocki, Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, focused on marriage as a right of
“fundamental importance.”186 The statute at issue, in that case, pre-
vented a subgroup of persons, those who did not pay child support,
from marrying.187 This classification is ripe for an equal protection
argument—as such, Joseph A. Pull explained that Zablocki is “struc-
tured like a classic equal protection opinion.”188 Even in Windsor,189
Justice Scalia was unsure whether the majority had applied a due pro-
cess or equal protection analysis in striking down DOMA. Justice
Scalia’s dissent reflected the confusion: “Moreover, if this is meant to
be an equal-protection opinion, it is a confusing one.”190
The next question that needs to be answered before Harry and
Sallie Mae tie the knot is under what circumstances may a State pre-
clude two persons from marrying. There have been recent debates, in
many states as to whether two same-sex individuals can marry.191 In all
of these debates, same-sex marriage supporters argue that the State
may not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation under the
Equal Protection Clause.192 Recent state decisions reflect that equal
protection may be the most fecund route, of challenging a State’s
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
186. Id. at 383.
187. Id. at 377.
188. Joseph A. Pull, Questioning the Fundamental Right to Marry, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 29
(2006).
189. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2014); Baskin v.
Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1026 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp.
2d 921, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2010), rev’d sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013);
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 878 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407, 411 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948
(Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,
867 (Vt. 1999).
192. See, e.g., Lewis, 908 A.2d at 200; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 404 (Cal. 2008)
(analyzing California’s definition of domestic partner under the California Constitution);
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953; Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1,
6 (N.Y. 2006).
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same-sex marriage ban.193 For example, California’s former anti-same-
sex marriage legislation stated, “[o]nly marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California.”194 California’s anti same-
sex marriage law, juxtaposed one subgroup of people, heterosexuals,
against another, homosexuals. This rift opened the door to equal pro-
tection challenges.
The instinctive reaction to the Harry and Sallie Mae hypothetical
may run something like this: “Of course a person cannot marry a cor-
poration, corporations cannot marry people!” The reaction accurately
reflects the most sensible legal conclusion—that a court would invali-
date a marriage between a person and a corporation because of the
corporation’s classification as an entity, and not a person. This follows
because “[t]he Equal Protection Clause is aimed at classifications.”195
This being said, however, precluding a subgroup of persons, whether
they are labeled homosexual, Latino, or artificial, is a classification
that, should the State wish to exclude them from marriage rights,
must be justified in the face of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus,
Sallie Mae could possibly find repose in an equal protection claim,
even in light of the extensive case law indicating that marriage is a
fundamental right and a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
III. Corporate Governance: When Harry Meets Sallie Mae,
Does She Say Yes? Can She?
Even if Sallie Mae made it to a fact-finding stage, a lawsuit at-
tempting to enforce a corporation’s right to marry Harry on an equal
protection theory would almost certainly be denied under rational ba-
sis review.196 Nevertheless, several interesting corporate law issues re-
193. See generally Justin Reinheimer, Same-Sex Marriage Through the Equal Protection
Clause: A Gender-Conscious Analysis, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 213, 227 (2006).
194. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004).
195. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1166 (1988).
196. A classification, such as this one, which does not involve suspect criteria or inter-
fere with the exercise of a fundamental right, is valid and will be upheld under the test, if it
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest or purpose. Regan v. Taxation
With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983). It is highly unlikely that the Supreme
Court would affiliate a corporation with a suspect class. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748–50 (2011). A party challenging a statute or regula-
tion must negate any reasonably plausible justification to prove that the classification is wholly
irrational. See Gusewelle v. City of Wood River, 374 F.3d 569, 578 (7th Cir. 2004). The state
could dream up any number of reasons why a corporation would not be allowed to marry a
person, not the least of which would be the repercussions of an unseen economic calamity.
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main. Part III begins with the somewhat ludicrous proposition that a
corporation would want to marry a person. What type of corporation
would find it beneficial to latch itself onto Harry? It is imaginable that
a corporation might want to marry a natural person for several rea-
sons. First, a corporation might want to marry a person to make a
point—e.g., a left-leaning corporation wishes to shed a negative light
onto the Supreme Court’s corporate personhood stance. Second, a
corporation might want to marry for publicity—imagine a little-known
entity wants its name in the media. Lastly, a mischievous or obtuse
sole-proprietor might wish to test the bounds of corporate tax law by
blurring the person/corporation line. Financial gain—whether from
new clientele, more fervent financial backers, or perfidious tax fil-
ings—could be the result of all three.
Of course, in order for any marriage to be valid, there must be
bilateral consent.197 But who can consent? Syntactically, we say that
the corporation acts—“that Nike denied that it knew about the wrong-
doing”198—but who says yes? For the purpose of the hypothetical, this
Article assumes the corporation, Sallie Mae, is a loosely held entity
with 100 shareholders and seven directors, a chief executive officer
(CEO), a chief operating officer (COO), and a president. Generally,
under relevant corporate law there are three ways by which a corpora-
tion may take a course of action: (1) the officers, such as the CEO or
president, are in control of the day-to-day affairs of the corporation,
and may manage the business as they see fit, subject to certain limita-
tions; (2) the directors, who are “the supreme authority in matters of
the corporation’s regular business management,” may act as the final
arbiter in certain affairs; and (3) the shareholders may vote to ap-
prove or disapprove of a transaction that fundamentally alters the cor-
porate form, such as a merger or consolidation.199
The Supreme Court has noted the “extremes to which the Court has gone in dreaming up
rational bases for state regulation.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
197. United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 1952), aff’d, 344 U.S. 604
(1953).
198. See Ripken, supra note 23, at 115.
199. 2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 9:5 (3d ed. 2013).
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A. The Officers
Because the corporation is an artificial entity, it can only act
through its agents.200 These agents include the CEO, president, vice
president, treasurer, and secretary.201 As will be discussed in greater
detail below, because the board of directors is the supreme decision-
maker with respect to the business of the corporation the “board of
directors confer[s] on the [agent] the authority to act.”202
Suppose that Harry goes to the president of Sallie Mae to pro-
pose.203 The president, as an agent of the corporation, is constrained
by the principles of agency—“[t]he president’s implied, apparent, or
inherent authority is limited to carrying on the corporation’s ordinary
business and does not extend to extraordinary transactions.”204 Under
the doctrine of inherent authority, the president may bind the corpo-
ration by contract without any express approval by the board of direc-
tors, but only if the transaction is in the usual course of business.205 Is
marriage one such transaction?
The role of the non-director corporate officer has increased.
Wielding considerable power and influence over a corporation’s busi-
ness and affairs, officers have replaced directors as the leaders in cor-
porate decision-making. In this central role, officers owe a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and its shareholders.206 Nevertheless, the ex-
ecutive officer, in this scenario, faces two challenges: (1) the marriage
must fall within the ordinary course of business, which it might not,
and (2) the decision to marry must not fall within the province of
board action. Since the directors must act within the ordinary course
of business, assume for the purpose of the hypothetical, that the presi-
dent takes the idea to the Sallie Mae’s board of directors.
B. The Board of Directors
The board’s potential role in orchestrating this affair is less clear.
In the corporate arena, boards of directors more often operate as an
ex post facto oversight committee rather than proactive “idea men”
(and women). As one court stated, “Directorial management does not
200. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 8:1 (3d ed. 2013).
201. Id. § 8:2.
202. Id. § 8:1.
203. All puns intended.
204. 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 200, § 8.6.
205. Id.
206. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
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require a detailed inspection of day-to-day activities, but rather a gen-
eral monitoring of corporate affairs and policies.”207 Among the top-
ics that require oversight are major corporate plans and action.
Although it is true that the board retains the power to “[i]nitiate and
adopt corporate plans, commitments, and actions,” these duties relate
to long-term evaluations and broad objectives and strategies.208 Fur-
thermore, major corporate plans and actions depend in large part on
knowledge of the inner-workings of the business of the corporation,
which is more likely to be possessed by the senior executives of a com-
pany than by the board of directors.209 Accordingly, after Harry went
to the President of Sallie Mae with his proposal, it would be up to the
board of directors to review it as a “major corporate plan.”210 The
board should carefully review and, when deemed appropriate, ap-
prove the relevant major business directives.211 Marrying a human be-
ing—with all of the attendant financial consequences—is probably
one such action.
Directors are not agents of a corporation, and have no power in-
dividually to bind it by any contract or otherwise.212 Directors must act
collectively as a board.213 They must do so at a legal, duly assembled
meeting.214 Adhering to these procedural requirements is important
because “[w]hat the directors decide as a board, the corporation does
in turn, so long as their actions are within the scope of the goals and
purposes of the corporation.”215 Additionally, the board may also rat-
ify the acts of its officers216—thus, if the president of Sallie Mae ac-
cepted Harry’s proposal, the board could choose to approve or
disapprove of the idea.
How fond must the directors be of Harry? How hard must he
court Sallie Mae? Surely, Sallie Mae cannot be betrothed on a whim or
207. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981).
208. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 3.02 (1994).
209. Id.
210. Id. (“[A]s a functional matter these judgments will normally be made, at least in
the first instance, by the principal senior executives, and more particularly the chief execu-
tive officer, because in most cases the executives shape the board’s agenda.”).
211. Id.
212. See 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 200, § 8:6.
213. See id.
214. 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 199, § 9:5.
215. Id.
216. 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 200, § 8:14 (“[A]n unauthorized act of a corporate
officer or agent can be ratified for the corporation by its board of directors, its sharehold-
ers, or one or more of its officers, depending on which of these has the power to authorize
the kind of act in question.”).
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caprice; the directors must evaluate what is in Sallie Mae’s best inter-
ests, pecuniary or otherwise. It is this precept that steers the evaluation
as to how directors would have to justify the proposal as a defensible
transaction.
Typically, directors owe a three-fold duty to the corporation: they
must be obedient, diligent, and loyal.217 Only the latter two considera-
tions are of concern to Harry and Sallie Mae.218 The duty to exercise
reasonable care and prudence affords wide latitude in transactional
decision-making.219 Directors are protected by the “Business Judg-
ment Rule,” which shields directors from losses sustained from impru-
dent but good-faith decision-making or honest errors of judgment.220
Realistically, so long as the board is acting with the corporation’s best
interests in mind, its decision will be vindicated.221 Indeed, as long as
“their errors [are not] so gross as to show their unfitness to manage
corporate affairs,” the board escapes liability.222 Thus, even though
“‘a better result may appear, especially with hindsight[,] . . . that con-
clusion does not necessarily mean a director’s decision was wrong
when made.’”223 As one court puts it, “[i]rrationality is the outer limit
of the business judgment rule.”224
Assuming the board acts reasonably in accordance with the busi-
ness judgment rule, the board must also exercise loyalty to the corpo-
ration.225 The line between these two duties is often blurred.226 The
217. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 199, § 10:1.
218. See Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
457, 458 (2011). Were a court to revive the duty of obedience, the marriage would violate
that, too because “‘[t]he duty of obedience requires a director to avoid committing ultra
vires acts, i.e., acts beyond the scope of the [authority] of the corporation as defined by its
[articles of incorporation] or the laws of the state of incorporation.’” Id. at 460 (quoting
Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719–20 (5th Cir. 1984)). Although
“[n]o modern for-profit corporation case has turned explicitly on the duty of obedience,”
a transaction as unusual and precarious as a marriage between a person and a corporations
would almost certainly be so beyond the scope of the articles of incorporation, especially in
light of the potentially drastic economic ramifications, that a court would have to find a
violation. Id.
219. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 208, § 3.02.
220. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 199, § 10:2.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48
BUS. LAW. 1337, 1342 (1992–1993) (quoting James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Leg-
islation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1232
(1988)).
224. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
225. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 199, 10:11.
226. Id.
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duty of care generally concerns the adequacy of the decision-making
process and the directors’ obligations to be prudent and thorough.227
The duty of loyalty, on the other hand, concerns the motives, pur-
poses, good-faith basis, and goals of the corporate actor—the justifica-
tions that serve as the basis for the transaction.228 For instance, self-
dealing contracts and other personally advantageous transactions in
which the director’s allegiance to the corporation could reasonably be
questioned are forbidden.229 A prime example of a breach of the duty
of loyalty is where an “officer or director has usurped a corporate op-
portunity.”230 Put simply, unless a corporate executive steals for him-
self an idea that would result in pecuniary gains for his company, the
executive is likely insulated from liability under the duty of loyalty.231
Presupposing that the marriage between a corporation and a per-
son is both an idea rooted in the desire for advertising-induced reve-
nue and a serious attempt to enter into a “social contract,” two
questions remain for Harry and Sallie Mae: (1) Is this action within
the scope of permissible board action; and (2) is the board legally
insulated from such conduct? In regards to the first question, the sim-
plest assessment is also the most helpful. The board of directors is
charged with making “business decisions.”232 They are responsible for
overseeing “contracts, which the corporation could legitimately
make.”233 An unusual transaction, though not purely financial, is still
a contract.234 Much like a corporation’s articles of incorporation may
limit the personal liability of shareholders, officers, or directors,235 a
couple entering into marriage may limit future liability through a pre-
nuptial agreement.236 Sallie Mae would undoubtedly draft a prenup-
227. Id.
228. Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties, and the Business Judgment Rule in Dela-
ware, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1061, 1069–70 (2009).
229. See id. at 1070 (“The duty of loyalty, then, demands that directors’ decisions be
based on a good-faith belief that chosen course of action is the best one for the
corporation.”).
230. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1544 (2014).
231. This Article assumes that, Sallie Mae’s executives do not have their own individual
romantic interest in Harry, and thus there is no concern that the directors might usurp a
corporate opportunity in this hypothetical.
232. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quotation omitted).
233. Beveridge v. New York El. R. Co., 19 N.E. 489, 494 (N.Y. 1889).
234. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 2 (2014) (“Marriage is generally considered a civil contract
differing in notable respects from ordinary contracts . . . .”).
235. REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02 (2002).
236. Carr v. Hancock, 607 S.E.2d 803, 806 (W. Va. 2004) (holding prenuptial agree-
ments that establish property settlements and support obligations at the time of divorce are
presumptively valid).
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tial agreement, carefully protecting against the potential financial
repercussions of this social experiment.237 Sallie Mae’s economic
rights would assuredly be invoked.
Sallie Mae’s social statement might fall outside the scope of per-
missible actions for officers and directors by virtue of its sheer irregu-
larity—the action of marrying Harry could conceivably constitute a
capricious and cavalier business directive.238 If this decision is prima-
rily left to the directors, would this publicity stunt subject them to civil
liability? It would be ludicrous to consider that the directors, whose
primary purpose was to raise publicity and profit for the corporation,
usurped a corporate opportunity violating the duty of loyalty, unless
any of them were retaining a secret interest in the transaction. If the
board of directors allowed Harry and Sallie Mae to marry, could it be
said that they failed to act “on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company?”239
The business judgment rule only requires that the directors or
officers “ ‘of a corporation act[ ] on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company.’”240 A failure to satisfy the business judgment rule
would subject the architects of the plan to personal civil liability. Thus,
the question is whether this is a case of “improvidence, of reckless,
unreasonable extravagance”?241 Is it really “irrational”?242 Is there “a
showing of fraud, illegality or conflict of interest”?243 The answer is
plainly no. Even in light of the tenuous constitutional footing, the pre-
carious post-marriage ramifications, and the bold social statement be-
ing made, the board of Sallie Mae’s decision to marry Harry would be
upheld so long as it was made in good faith. Indeed, in examining the
237. Prenuptials are increasingly popular. According to one author, “everyone contem-
plating marriage should consider drawing up a prenuptial agreement.” Allison A. Marston,
Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 892 (1997). This
would apply to someone with everything to lose (Sallie Mae), and someone with everything
to gain (Harry). Though it would be an interesting discussion, this Article will not address
the potentially limitless analysis of what could happen if a marriage between a human and
a corporation dissolved without a prenuptial agreement. The possibilities of bankruptcy,
divorce, corporate restructuring, and Harry’s death disrupting Harry and Sallie Mae’s po-
tential union are beyond the scope of this Article.
238. See 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 200, § 8:3.
239. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
240. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 83, 89 (2004).
241. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71, 79 (1880).
242. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
243. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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processes by which the board based their decision, the board could eas-
ily legitimize this idea by asserting that they were primarily motivated
by financial gain that would surely benefit Sallie Mae’s stockhold-
ers.244 Accordingly, the board could certainly find safe-haven in spa-
cious contours of the business judgment rule.
C. Shareholders245
Harry and Sallie Mae’s marriage involves the combination of sep-
arate entities that would generate a new singular entity. Generally,
corporate combinations of this sort—those that envision significant
structural changes—are deemed “fundamental.”246 Fundamental cor-
porate transactions are those “characterized by their extraordinary na-
ture as well as by the unusual changes they bring either to the
corporate business or to the rights of its shareholders.”247 Because
fundamental transactions directly invoke the financial rights, risks,
and returns of the shareholders, the shareholder’s input is almost al-
ways required.248
Essentially, the shareholders have ultimate ratification power. “It
is because of their effects on the business and the shareholders that
the authority to undertake such transactions is not commended solely
to the discretion of the board of directors, but must be authorized by
244. The business judgment rule is generally concerned with ensuring that the officers
and directors are making an informed decision. It regulates the process much more than
the results. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (explaining that direc-
tors who fail “to act in an informed and deliberate manner” may not assert the business
judgment rule as a defense to care claims). Where the contested action concerns profits
and pecuniary advantage, the courts will not interfere. See Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383
N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (“The
directors’ room rather than the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out
purely business questions which will have an impact of on profits, market prices, competi-
tive situations, or tax advantages.”).
245. This section assumes that the engagement is a board or officer-initiated idea.
Interestingly, ideas founded in the socially-progressive/conscious arena are often initiated
by shareholders. These initiatives are referred to as shareholder proposals, which carve out
an exception for shareholders to urge the corporation to take a course of action by
including the initiative in the corporation’s proxy materials. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j)(1)-
(2) (2011); see also Apache Corp. v. N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 621 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.
Tex. 2008). A primary issue is whether a proposal involves issues of “ordinary business
problems,” which are traditionally left to the board of directors, or whether the proposal
introduces significant social policy issues such that it would necessitate a shareholder vote
for approval. Id.
246. Parson v. Roper Whitney, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1447, 1449 (W.D. Wis. 1984); 4 JAMES
D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 22:12 (3d ed.
2013).
247. 4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 246, § 25:1.
248. See id.
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some specified vote or written consent of the shareholders.”249 The
board has power to recommend ideas to shareholders. These ideas
may include for example, “corporate actions that require shareholder
approval, such as the election of directors or a significant merger; cor-
porate actions that are susceptible of shareholder approval.”250 But is
marriage really a fundamental change to corporate structure requiring
shareholder approval? And if so, which type?
There are three basic types of corporate combination: merger,
consolidation, and a sale-purchase of assets. Since this hypothetical
does not involve an antiquated dowry system,251 nor does the marriage
contemplate buying all of anyone’s assets, we focus on merger and
consolidation. Merger and consolidation are separate forms of combi-
nation.252 In both cases, a favorable shareholder vote is required at a
meeting, duly called on proper notice, at which a quorum is
present.253
Consolidation is a “uniting or amalgamation of two or more ex-
isting corporations to form a new corporation.”254 This appears to be
a decent, but not perfect fit for Harry and Sallie Mae’s marriage. It is
true that the newlywed couple forms a new union—“Mr. & Mrs. Sallie
Mae”—but in a real marriage both entities maintain a separate legal
existence—people do not cease to exist merely because they get
hitched. When two natural people get married, they keep their own
identities, their own names, titles, and property.255 Thus, although a
marriage brings two “people” together to form a “union,” it is not the
same scenario as in a consolidation in which “the existence of all
the . . . entities terminates and a new [entity] is created.”256 Perhaps
Harry and Sallie Mae’s union is better described as a merger.
249. Id.
250. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 208, § 3.02.
251. Tara S. Kaushik, The Essential Nexus Between Transformative Laws and Culture: The
Ineffectiveness of Dowry Prohibition Laws of India, 1 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 74, 77 (2003)
(quoting Anshu Nangia, The Tragedy of Bride Burning in India: How Should the Law Address
It?, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 637, 639 (1996–1997) (“‘[M]ovable or immovable property that a
bride’s father or guardian gives to the bridegroom, his parents, or his relatives as a condi-
tion to the marriage, and under duress, coercion or pressure’ or ‘cash, consumer goods,
and jewelry that a wife brought with her to her husband’s household.’”).
252. 4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 246, § 22:2.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (holding any property as separate if it was
owned before the marriage or it was acquired after the marriage by way of gift, devise, or
descent).
256. Akwell Corp. v. Eiger, 141 F. Supp. 19, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (emphasis added).
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In a merger, one existing entity is absorbed by the other, which
survives and continues the combined business and existence.257 How-
ever, the Supreme Court, in Trammel v. United States, rejected the idea
that the wife “merged into” her husband, thereby losing her distinct
existence, while his existence continued.258 In that case, the Court re-
jected the concept that husband and wife were one, and that since the
woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband was
the surviving entity contemplated in a merger.259
In actuality, a marriage is not a corporate business merger, as Sal-
lie Mae and Harry would not unify into some new business entity. Fur-
ther, the scenario would not work semantically under state law.
According to Delaware’s incorporation statute, “[a]ny 2 or more cor-
porations existing under the laws of this State may merge into a single
corporation.”260 Harry is not a corporation, so he cannot be one of
the two corporations necessary to merge. Likewise, New York’s merger
statute is available only to domestic or foreign corporations or some
sort of “other business entity.”261 But Harry is not a business entity
either. Unfortunately for Harry, “[o]ther business entity means any
person other than a natural person.”262 Accordingly, it is exceedingly
difficult to see how under state corporate law this “merger” would
happen.
D. Partnership
Perhaps the most obvious combination is also the most applicable
to Harry and Sallie Mae’s situation: partnership. Under Delaware law,
a partnership is formed through “the association of 2 or more per-
sons . . . to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”263 As discussed
above, corporations are treated as persons both semantically and for
purposes of constitutional interpretation.264 The laws of partnership
are no different: under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act a “per-
son” who may associate in a partnership means an “individual, corpora-
257. 4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 246, § 22:10.
258. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); see also Louis W. Hensler III,
The Trammel Court’s Hasty Rejection of Jerry Maguire’s View of Marriage, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
325, 358 (2006).
259. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 45–46.
260. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2014).
261. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 904-a (McKinney 2008).
262. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 901 (McKinney 1999).
263. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-202(a) (West 2010).
264. See supra Part II.
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tion, business trust, estate, [etc.].”265 Corporations maintain the ability
to participate in partnership business, just as natural persons do. A
corporation has the power “to purchase, receive, subscribe for, or oth-
erwise acquire; own, hold, vote, use, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or
otherwise dispose of; and deal in and with shares or other interests in,
or obligations of, any other entity.”266
There are several parallels between forming a partnership and
getting married. Perhaps Justice Cardozo said it best when he stated
for each partner “the venture had its phases of fair weather and of
foul. The two were in it jointly, for better or worse.”267 Indeed, the
language used to describe partnerships sounds just like marriage:
“[A]n association of two . . . adult persons to form a single economi-
cally and emotionally supportive family.”268
What protocols would Sallie Mae need to follow in order to enter
into a partnership with Harry? Creating corporate partnerships is
within the province of the board of directors, who are charged with
“adopt[ing] corporate plans, commitments, and actions.”269 Indeed, a
“corporation executes its business affairs by way of the decisions of its
board of directors to which they are bound.”270 Entering into a part-
nership is quintessentially a business affair.271 And what of their re-
spective property? Unless otherwise stated, “property acquired by a
partnership is property of the partnership and not of the partners in-
dividually.”272 The property that predates the partnership belongs to
the individual, not the partnership.273 This is precisely the same rule
265. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 101 (10) (1997) (emphasis added).
266. REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(6) (2002).
267. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928). The quote is an
intentional allusion to traditional marriage vows: “To have and to hold from this day for-
ward, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and to
cherish, till death us do part, according to God’s holy ordinance; and thereto I plight thee
my troth.” See Bridgeman v. Bridgeman, 391 S.E.2d 367, 370 (W. Va. 1990) (quoting Solem-
nization of Matrimony, THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 301 (1928)).
268. Jennifer A. Drobac & Antony Page, A Uniform Domestic Partnership Act: Marrying
Business Partnership and Family Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 349, 402 (2007); see also Martha M.
Ertman, Marriage As A Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 79, 83 (2001) (“Yet the business models discussed in this Article (business partner-
ships, corporations, and limited liability companies) are similar to intimate relationships in
that they have significant status elements that complement their contractual character.”).
269. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 208, at § 3.02.
270. Tomlin v. Ceres Corp., 507 F.2d 642, 648 (5th Cir. 1975).
271. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-202(a) (West 2010). A corporate partnership in-
volves “[c]arry[ing] on as co-owners a business for profit.” Id. (emphasis added).
272. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-203 (West 2009); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 203
(1997).
273. See supra Part II.A.
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in marriage.274 It is unlikely that forging a partnership between Harry
and Sallie Mae would require a shareholder vote. Shareholder votes
are reserved for extraordinary transactions,275 as opposed to business
transactions that do not affect existing stock.276 Indeed, although a
shareholder vote is required where the corporation conveys, transfers,
or leases all or substantially all of its property,277 individual entities
keep their own property. Thus, structurally speaking, Harry and Sallie
Mae may configure as a united entity under state partnership law.
Conclusion
Even supposing that Harry and Sallie Mae proceeded with their
joint venture, they still would not be married. Suppose that Sallie Mae,
by virtue of its status as a person and entitled to rights under the Con-
stitution, demands its rights just like natural persons. How would Sal-
lie Mae and Harry go through with the actual marriage filing?
In New York, a couple who intends to be married in New York
State must apply to any town or city clerk in the state in person for a
marriage license.278 This license must be signed by both applicants in
the presence of the town or city clerk.279 Because the corporation may
only act through its agents,280 either “the chief executive officer, presi-
dent, vice president, treasurer, [or] secretary,” would have to accom-
pany Harry to the city clerk.281 Moreover, in New York, a person
wishing to get married is required to establish proof of age and iden-
tity by submitting to the issuing clerk both an age-related282 and iden-
tity verification document.283 To prove its age, Sallie Mae would likely
have to hand over a copy of its certificate of incorporation, which
would prove its identity and its date of incorporation.
274. See William A. Snyder, Jr. & James D. Walsh, Uniform Marital Property Act Affects
Spouses’ Rights at Death and Divorce, 18 Est. Plan. 28, 29 (1991).
275. Carlton Herzog, Ramparts and Palisades: Archetypical Structures in Hostile Battles for
Corporate Control, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 817, 817 n.9 (1990).
276. 4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 246, § 25:1.
277. Id.
278. Information on Getting Married in New York State, N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www
.health.ny.gov/publications/4210/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
279. Id.
280. See 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 200, § 8:1.
281. Id. § 8:2.
282. Id. (explaining the acceptable age documents include: birth certificates, baptismal
records, naturalization records, and census records).
283. Id. (explaining the acceptable identity documents include: driver’s licenses, pass-
ports, employment picture IDs, and immigration records).
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Technically, no restrictions exist about what sorts of persons—
natural or artificial—may get married. Would a city clerk really accept
this? It is unlikely, though anything is possible considering Angela
Marie Vogel and “Corporate Person” were errantly approved by ad-
ministrators in Seattle, Washington.284 Realistically, however, Sallie
Mae should not hold its corporate breath.
Although courts have long since established corporate rights
under the Constitution, marriage does not seem to be one of them.
Nor should it. The extent to which corporate rights are being pro-
tected under the Constitution are in stark contrast to the purpose of
the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments. Perhaps there
is no better example of misuse of these constitutional protections than
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was originally
intended to apply to freed slaves.285 Instead, it has served the interests
of corporations seeking to broaden their rights as “persons.”286 The
extent of corporate personhood should remain limited, lest the courts
wish to address other chimerical legal arguments such as the one
presented in this Article.
Nevertheless, even with Citizens United’s focus on the scope of the
constitutional right asserted—irrespective of the person or entity as-
serting that right—it is not clear that the established right to marriage
is a right that is open to corporations. That “right,” established under
the protections of liberty afforded by due process, is not available for
artificial entities. Nor does the equal protection doctrine appear to be
the grimoire for advancing social corporate liberty. Surely a State
could recite any number of reasons for why a corporation should not
marry a person sufficient to dismiss a suit pursuant to rational basis
review.
Likewise, Hobby Lobby’s reinvigoration of an aggregate theory of
corporate personhood will likely also doom this experiment. The Su-
preme Court’s holding that corporate rights are derivative of the
rights of the small group of shareholders beneath the corporate form
unravels the analogy.287 For instance, “[f]urthering their religious
284. See supra note 3.
285. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976) (“[T]he
39th Congress [that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment] was intent upon establishing in
the federal law a broader principle than would have been necessary simply to meet the
particular and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves.”); Angelo Guisado, Rever-
sal of Fortune: The Inapposite Standards Applied to Remedial Race-, Gender-, and Orientation-Based
Classifications, 92 NEB. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (2013).
286. See Rubin, supra note 16, at 567.
287. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
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freedom also ‘furthers individual religious freedom.’”288 Hobby Lobby
allows corporations to assert RFRA claims to protect the religious lib-
erty of the underlying closely held group of shareholders.289 The hy-
pothetical marriage between Sallie Mae and Harry does not further
the individual freedom to marry for the underlying Sallie Mae share-
holders. Really, Harry wishes to further the religious rights of the corpo-
ration itself, as a “real entity.”290 The equal protection argument hinges
on the corporation’s right to distinguish itself as a quasi-protected
class against which it is being discriminated. The aggregate theory is
fatal to that argument. So, unfortunately for our cunning protagonist,
Harry will have to find repose in a formal corporate partnership,
which doubtlessly carries not nearly the same romanticism, for better
or for worse.
288. Id. at 2769.
289. Id.
290. See supra Part I.C.
